

Tool-Use Robot Manipulation Tasks for Cooperative and Explainable Operations in Safety-Critical Domains

Dissertation Defense, March 2025

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Problem and Motivation

Robotics for Space Exploration

The Artemis missions will return humanity to the Moon to learn about establishing continuous presence in space.

Crew time could be used more effectively for science mission goals if robots help with the many tasks of space exploration.



Inspired by slides from the Johnson Space Center Dexterous Robotics Team.



[1] NASA, "Artemis," NASA, [Online], 2024.

[2] NASA, "Moon to Mars Architecture," NASA, [Online], 2024.

Human-Robot Teams in Extreme Domains

We need robots to operate as capable, trusted agents on human-robot teams in various safety-critical problem domains.

To achieve this, we consider two key challenges: (1) robot manipulation capabilities and (2) robot safety reasoning.



Tool-Use Tasks on Human-Robot Teams


Reasoning over *object affordances* (“action possibilities” or “opportunities for action”) and executing afforded *actions in tool-use tasks* are challenging.

We want robots to function on *human-robot teams* alongside humans without robotics experience.


Therefore, we want our methods and results to be *explainable* and minimize expert knowledge engineering.

[3] J. Gibson, “The Theory of Affordances,” *Perceiving, Acting, and Knowing: Towards an Ecological Psychology*, 1977.

[4] AMP von Bayern *et al.*, “Compound Tool Construction by New Caledonian Crows,” *Scientific Reports*, 2018.



Trust and Safety on Human-Robot Teams



Safety and trust are important when robots operate alongside humans.

Human operators may mistrust or overtrust robots when expectations do not align with the robot's capabilities.

We explore explainable methods to promote understanding and trust for safe operations on human-robot teams.

[5] M. Vasic and A. Billard, "Safety Issues in Human-Robot Interactions," *IEEE ICRA*, 2013.

[6] Y. Zhang *et al.*, "DANLI: Deliberative Agent for Following Natural Language Instructions," *arXiv preprint arXiv:2210.12485*, 2022.

[7] J. D. Lee and K. A. See, "Trust in Automation: Designing for Appropriate Reliance," *Human Factors*, 2004.

[8] P. Robinette *et al.*, "Overtrust of Robots in Emergency Evacuation Scenarios," *IEEE Conference on HRI*, 2016.



[9] B. Kuipers, "Trust and Cooperation," *Frontiers in Robotics and AI*, 2022.

Dissertation Contributions

Autonomous **planning of complex assembly actions**
(ICRA 2022)

Reliable and **explainable execution of tool-use tasks**
(IROS 2024)

Safety reasoning on human-robot teams
(UR 2025, Under Review)



Dissertation Contributions

(higher-level discussion)

Autonomous **planning** of complex assembly actions

(ICRA 2022)



Reliable and **explainable** execution of tool-use tasks

(IROS 2024)

Safety reasoning on human-robot teams

(UR 2025, Under Review)

(most technical detail)





Dissertation Contributions

Autonomous **planning of complex assembly actions**
(ICRA 2022)


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Safety reasoning on human-robot teams
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
Planning Complex Actions: Causal Control Basis

Complex Actions in Assembly Tasks



Tool-use and assembly tasks require advanced planning over **objects**, their separate **parts**, and their **affordances**.

Object-Centric Controllers



Reasoning over affordances and executing actions can be simplified with **object-centric controllers**, which formulate objectives with respect to **object or task frames** instead of the world frame.

[11] D. H. Ballard, "Task Frames in Robot Manipulation," *AAAI*, 1984.

[12] S. Hart, P. Dinh, and K. Hambuchen, "The Affordance Template ROS Package for Robot Task Programming," *IEEE ICRA*, 2015.

Controller Compositions

Object-centric controllers can be **composed** to create a behavior with a **multi-objective role** in a plan, meaning it achieves **multiple task goals**.

Composed behaviors **prioritize** one behavior over another so they can be **executed concurrently**.



[13] R. Platt, A. H. Fagg, R. A. Grupen, "Whole Body Grasping," [Online], 2004.


[14] R. Platt, A. H. Fagg, R. A. Grupen, "Nullspace Composition of Control Laws for Grasping," *IEEE IROS*, 2002.

[15] R. Platt, A. H. Fagg, R. A. Grupen, "Manipulation Gaits: Sequences of Grasp Control Tasks," *IEEE ICRA*, 2004.

[16] R. Platt, A. H. Fagg, R. A. Grupen, "Null-Space Grasp Control: Theory and Experiments," *IEEE Transactions on Robotics*, 2010.

Challenge: Autonomous Composition

Many works compose controllers using predefined priorities based on expert experience. We want the robot to autonomously compose controllers to minimize expert knowledge engineering.



For example, the robot needs to use its gripper (green block) to push the red block up the grey wall. We expect the robot to autonomously prioritize the given controllers. In this case, it prioritizes force (0) over positioning (1).

[14] R. Platt, A. H. Fagg, R. A. Grupen, "Nullspace Composition of Control Laws for Grasping," *IEEE IROS*, 2002.

[15] R. Platt, A. H. Fagg, R. A. Grupen, "Manipulation Gaits: Sequences of Grasp Control Tasks," *IEEE ICRA*, 2004.

[17] M. Sharma *et al.*, "Hierarchical Object-Centric Controllers for Robotics Manipulation," *arXiv preprint arXiv:2011.04627*, 2020.

[18] S. Hart and R. Grupen, "Natural Task Decomposition with Intrinsic Potential Fields," *IEEE IROS*, 2007.

Insight: Causality

We take inspiration from **causal reasoning**, or **cause-effect relationships** in long-horizon tasks.

We expect the robot to **autonomously compose controllers** by quantitatively predicting which composed behavior will achieve the **intended composed effects** within a task plan.

[19] C. Xiong *et al.*, “Robot Learning with a Spatial, Temporal, and Causal And-Or Graph,” *IEEE ICRA*, 2016.

[20] J. Pearl, *Causality*, Cambridge University Press, 2009.

[21] I. Dasgupta *et al.*, “Causal Reasoning from Meta-Reinforcement Learning,” *arXiv preprint arXiv:1901.08162*, 2019.



Causal Control Basis

We propose a **causal control basis**, which annotates a **control basis** (set of object-centric controllers that form the building blocks of action execution) with **causal graphs** to enable **autonomous controller compositions** based on the **intended composed effects**.

We test our approach in furniture assembly tasks.

Composed Causal Graphs

The causal control basis describes the multi-objective furniture connection actions by specifying the precondition states, controllers that will cause a change in the environment, and the intended composed effects of the action.



Composed Causal Graphs


The **composed causal graph** indicates what behaviors may achieve the composed effects, but not **how to compose the controllers** to realize these effects.

$$\phi_{\text{pos}} \triangleleft \phi_{\text{rot}}$$

$$\phi_{\text{rot}} \triangleleft \phi_{\text{pos}}$$

left-hand side:
lower-priority

right-hand side:
higher-priority



Composed Causal Graphs


The robot will **autonomously estimate the state-action utility** of executing each possible composition to achieve the intended effects in the assembly task.

$$\phi_{\text{pos}} \triangleleft \phi_{\text{rot}}$$

$$\phi_{\text{rot}} \triangleleft \phi_{\text{pos}}$$

left-hand side:
lower-priority


right-hand side:
higher-priority



Furniture Part Connection Policy

To estimate how well each **multi-objective action** a will achieve its composed effects, the robot will perform N **Monte Carlo simulations** to estimate the **state-action utility** of possible **compositions**

$$\hat{Q}(s, a) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=1}^N \hat{Q}_n(s, a)$$




Furniture Part Connection Policy

During task execution, the robot will choose the behavior with the **maximum predicted state-action utility** based on the Monte Carlo simulations:

$$\hat{Q}(s, a) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=1}^N \hat{Q}_n(s, a)$$


$$a = \pi(s) = \arg \max_a \left(\hat{Q}(s, a) \right)$$



[22] S. Russell and P. Norvig, *Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach, Fourth Edition*, Pearson Education, 2020.


[23] M. L. Litman, T. L. Dean, and L. P. Kaelbling, "On the Complexity of Solving Markov Decision Problems," *arXiv preprint arXiv:1302.4971*, 2013.

Causal Control Basis for Furniture Assembly



We use an off-the-shelf high-level task planner to sequence high-level actions. The **causal control basis** describes how to sequence low-level controllers and how to **autonomously compose** the multi-objective connection actions.

Assembly Experiments



The causal control basis selected composition $\phi_{\text{pos}} \triangleleft \phi_{\text{rot}}$ for composed effect inserted and composition $\phi_{\text{rot}} \triangleleft \phi_{\text{screw}} \triangleleft \phi_{\text{pos}}$ for composed effect screwed-in.

Furniture Assembly Results

The multi-objective actions the **causal control basis** predicted to achieve the composed effects enabled the robot to perform **furniture assembly tasks with reasonable success.**


Connection Action	Successful Connections	Connection Attempts	Success Rate
Insert	20	28	0.714
Screw	40	42	0.952
TOTAL	60	70	0.857

The results provide evidence that the **causal control basis** effectively captures causal information relevant for **autonomously composing controllers** for complex behaviors.

Future Work for Composed Causality

Future work beyond the scope of the dissertation includes:


- Evaluation in **real-world assembly tasks**
- Extending to tasks that require **whole-body manipulation**
- More detailed **failure analysis** to determine patterns in performance



Planning Complex Actions

We demonstrate that the **causal control basis** effectively provides causal information for **autonomous controller composition** (ICRA 2022).

The **causal control basis** uses **explainable cause-effect relationships** to minimize the **expert knowledge** required to perform complex tasks.




Dissertation Contributions

Autonomous **planning of complex assembly actions**
(ICRA 2022)

Reliable and **explainable execution of tool-use tasks**
(IROS 2024)

Safety reasoning on human-robot teams
(UR 2025, Under Review)




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
Reliable and Explainable Actions: Grasp Reflex Model

Reliable and Explainable Behaviors

To promote understanding on human-robot teams, we need the complex actions in tool-use and assembly tasks to be explainable.



Robot Grasping



Robot **grasping** achieves contacts and forces to restrain objects for manipulation.

Multi-fingered end-effectors provide abundant sensor signals and degrees-of-freedom for **performing dexterous manipulations**.

[27] A. Bicchi and V. Kumar, "Robotic Grasping and Contact: A Review," *IEEE ICRA*, 2000.

[28] T. Mouri, H. Kawasaki, and S. Ito, "Unknown Object Grasping Strategy Imitating Human Grasping Reflex for Anthropomorphic Robot Hand," *Journal of Advanced Mechanical Design, Systems, and Manufacturing*, 2007.

Challenge: Explainability in Action Models

Data-driven approaches for learning and modeling actions show significant promise and great performance.

But neural network and deep learning approaches tend to be black-box models that lead to poor understanding on human-robot teams in safety-critical domains.

[26] Y. Zhang *et al.*, “Plan Explicability for Robot Task Planning,” *RSS Workshop on Planning for Human-Robot Interaction: Shared Autonomy and Collaborative Robotics*, 2016.

[29] NASA, “NASA Risk Management Handbook,” [Online], 2011.

[30] NASA, “NASA Safety Culture Handbook,” [Online], 2015.

Insight: Human Grasp Reflex



We take inspiration from the **human grasp reflex**, specifically the involuntary newborn palmar reflex.

Similar reflex control approaches map **sensory data** to **learned patterns of response**.

We aim to learn a **reflex model** for grasping that reduces knowledge engineering while remaining **explainable**.

[31] A. Anekar and B. Bordoni, "Palmar Grasp Reflex," *StatPearls Publishing*, 2012.

[32] Y. Futagi, Y. Toribe, and Y. Sazuki, "The Grasp Reflex and Moro Reflex in Infants: Hierarchy of Primitive Reflex Responses," *International Journal of Pediatrics*, 2012.

[33] G. Bekey and R. Tomovic, "Robot Control by Reflex Actions," *IEEE ICRA*, 1986.


Grasp Reflex Modeling

We propose a simple, explainable grasp reflex model that allows the robot to adjust its grasp on a tool until it is secure enough for a tool manipulation task.

Grasp Reflex Model

The grasp reflex model uses a simple logistic regression model to map continuous end-effector joint states to discrete symbolic adjustment states.

The known symbolic adjustment states are prerequisite states for adjustment actions that allow the robot to improve its grasp on the tool.



Grasping Novel Tools

training
drill



testing
tools

After learning the [grasp reflex model](#) on a training tool, we performed experiments to test how well the learned reflex [generalized](#) to grasping [novel test tools](#).

Grasping Novel Tools



We provide **one reference** joint configuration for each test tool as an example of a secure grasp.

The robot repeatedly attempts grasps and adjusts its grasp until the **grasp reflex model** predicts the grasp is secure.

One-Shot Tactile Servoing on Novel Tools

Screwdriver




SUCCESS!

Paint Scraper

FAILED

Level

FAILED



Gyroscopic Drill




SUCCESS!

Selfie Stick

SUCCESS!

Compressed Air Can

SUCCESS!



Grasp Reflex Model Results

Tool	Practical for End-Effector	In-Hand Grasp Success Rate	Manipulation Grasp Success Rate
Drill	Yes	1.00	1.00
Screwdriver	Yes	1.00	0.83
Paint Scraper	Yes	1.00	0.67
Level	Yes	0.83	0.67
Gyroscopic Drill	Yes	1.00	0.50
Selfie Stick	No	1.00	0.33
Compressed Air Can	No	1.00	0.17
CUMULATIVE	-	0.98	0.60
PRACTICAL CUMULATIVE	-	0.97	0.73

We evaluated **in-hand** (the robot did not drop the tool) and **manipulation** (secure enough for subsequent tool-use tasks) grasps.

Grasp Reflex Model Results


The results show promise for a simple, **inherently explainable action reflex**. However, we may need to **model distributions of tool features** (size, graspable surface area, weight distribution).

Tool	Practical for End-Effector	In-Hand Grasp Success Rate	Manipulation Grasp Success Rate
Drill	Yes	1.00	1.00
Screwdriver	Yes	1.00	0.83
Paint Scraper	Yes	1.00	0.67
Level	Yes	0.83	0.67
Gyroscopic Drill	Yes	1.00	0.50
Selfie Stick	No	1.00	0.33
Compressed Air Can	No	1.00	0.17
CUMULATIVE	-	0.98	0.60
PRACTICAL CUMULATIVE	-	0.97	0.73


Future Work for Grasp Reflex Modeling

Future work beyond the scope of the dissertation includes:

- Training over a set of **representative tools and features**
- Learning different **types of grasps** (precision, trigger) and **adjustment actions**
- Autonomous **exploration** or “**play**” to learn about different tools



Explainable Actions



We demonstrate the promise of a simple, inherently explainable grasp reflex model for achieving reliable performance and generalizable behaviors (IROS 2024).


The grasp reflex model uses explainable symbolic adjustments to promote understandable action execution on human-robot teams.

Dissertation Contributions

Autonomous **planning of complex assembly actions**
(ICRA 2022)

Reliable and **explainable execution of tool-use tasks**
(IROS 2024)

Safety reasoning on human-robot teams
(UR 2025, Under Review)




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
Safety reasoning on human-robot teams
(UR 2025, Under Review)



Safety Reasoning: Human-Robot Red Teaming

Safety and Trust

For robots to be effective performing cooperative tasks in safety-critical domains, we expect robots to earn trust on human-robot teams.



[5] M. Vasic and A. Billard, "Safety Issues in Human-Robot Interactions," *IEEE ICRA*, 2013.


[6] Y. Zhang *et al.*, "DANLI: Deliberative Agent for Following Natural Language Instructions," *arXiv preprint arXiv:2210.12485*, 2022.

[9] B. Kuipers, "Trust and Cooperation," *Frontiers in Robotics and AI*, 2022.

[36] BS Dhillon, ARM Fashandi, and KL Liu, "Robot Systems Reliability and Safety: A Review," *Journal of Quality in Maintenance Engineering*, 2002.

Challenge: Safety Reasoning

Despite the consensus on the importance of robot safety, much research **overtrusts** the robot's capabilities and/or the human operators to guarantee safe operations.



[5] M. Vasic and A. Billard, "Safety Issues in Human-Robot Interactions," *IEEE ICRA*, 2013.

[6] Y. Zhang *et al.*, "DANLI: Deliberative Agent for Following Natural Language Instructions," *arXiv preprint arXiv:2210.12485*, 2022.

[9] B. Kuipers, "Trust and Cooperation," *Frontiers in Robotics and AI*, 2022.


[36] BS Dhillon, ARM Fashandi, and KL Liu, "Robot Systems Reliability and Safety: A Review," *Journal of Quality in Maintenance Engineering*, 2002.

Insight: Red Teaming

Robots use **models** to **simplify reasoning** in an unboundedly complex world.

While simplifying models are useful, disastrous outcomes occur when a critical factor is left out of the model.

Red teaming considers adversarial perspectives to **improve decision making**.



[37] B. Kuipers, "AI and Society: Ethics, Trust, and Cooperation," *Communications of the ACM*, 2023.


[38] A. Yang *et al.*, "Characterizing Warfare in Red Teaming," *IEEE Systems, Man, and Cybernetics*, 2006.

[39] D. F. Longbine, "Red Teaming: Past and Present," *School of Advanced Military Studies, Army Command and General Staff College*, 2008.


[40] M. Zenko, *Red Team: How to Succeed by Thinking Like the Enemy*, Basic Books, 2015.

Computational Red Teams

Computational red teams (CRTs) are teams of computational agents that automate the adversary red team trying to thwart the blue team's objective. The CRT helps improve decision making on the blue team.



Blue Team




Red Team

[41] D. Ganguli *et al.*, “Red Teaming Language Models to Reduce Harms: Methods, Scaling Behaviors, and Lessons Learned,” *arXiv preprint arXiv:2209.07858*, 2022.


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CRTs for Safety-Critical Tasks

Our preliminary experiments with the current state-of-the-art computational agents indicate that fully automated CRTs may not effectively update modeled knowledge. Furthermore, research suggests **humans are necessary for evaluative moral and ethical judgments.**



Blue Team
(ChatGPT)



Red Team
(English-like chatbot)

[43] T. B. Sheridan, "Human-Robot Interaction: Status and Challenges," *Human Factors*, 2016.

[44] B. Kuipers, "How Can We Trust a Robot?," *Communications of the ACM*, 2018.


[45] B. Kuipers, "Perspectives on Ethics of AI," *The Oxford Handbook of Ethics of AI*, Oxford University Press, 2020.

Human-Robot Red Teaming Approach



To overcome challenges faced by computational red teams, we propose a **human-robot red team (HRRT)** to allow human and robot agents to collaboratively analyze safety in **shared autonomy tasks**.

Human-Robot Red Teaming Approach



The **HRRT** (as a subset of CRT) does not act as an adversary thwarting the blue team's objectives, but rather a **challenger** to the **human-robot blue team's** modeled knowledge, expectations, assumptions, and contingency plans.

Levels of Computational Red Teaming

Computational red teams (CRTs) are categorized according to their **level** of reasoning:

- **CRT0**: Simple decision-making agents do not evolve.
- **CRT1**: Agents learn and adapt.
- **CRT2**: Teams of agents learn and adapt together.
- **CRT3**: Teams evolve within a dynamic environment.
- **CRT4**: Teams reflect and unlearn their biases to learn better approaches.

Levels of Red Teaming

Computational red teams (CRTs) are categorized according to their level of reasoning:

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- **CRT4**: Teams reflect and unlearn their biases to learn better approaches.

We suggest that **human-robot red teaming** will similarly benefit from **multiple levels** of capability to characterize responsibilities.

HRRTs as Subsets of CRTs

Computational red teams (CRTs) are categorized according to their level of reasoning:

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- **CRT4**: Teams reflect and unlearn their biases to learn better approaches.

We observe that some of the CRT levels focus on teams of agents and propose comparable levels to **human-robot red teaming**, where **HRRTs are specific subsets of CRTs** where computational agents work on teams alongside humans.

Levels of Human-Robot Red Teaming

Human-robot red teams (HRRTs) are categorized according to their **level** of reasoning:

- **HRRT2:** Teams of human and robot agents learn and adapt together by **enumerating possibilities** given their knowledge of the environment.
- **HRRT3:** Teams of human and robot agents evolve within a dynamic environment by **challenging assumptions** implicit in their modeled knowledge.
- **HRRT4:** Teams of human and robot agents **reflect** together and **improve modeled knowledge** to address “unknown unknowns.”

Overview of HRRT Levels and Iterations

Current Model
 $M = (S, A)$

Model M is set of symbolic states S and actions A that describe the **robot's reasoning** in an environment

A complete model M^* of an unboundedly complex world is intractable, so the robot reasons over **simplified model** $M \subset M^*$

We need to ensure model M allows the team to adequately **reason about safety**, so we analyze what may be left out of M to create **updated model** M'

Overview of HRRT Levels and Iterations


Current Model
 $M = (S, A)$

Level HRRT2:
analyze possible
states in M

HRRT2 identifies state transitions, however unlikely, and prompts the team to reflect on the **validity** of these **possibilities** and if there are **expected possibilities not reflected** by the current model

$$\mathcal{H}_2(M) = \{(s, a, s') \mid s, s' \in S(M), a \in A(M), \text{actionable}(a, s), \text{effect}(a, s')\}$$

Overview of HRRT Levels and Iterations




$$\mathcal{H}_3(M) = (\Omega_{\text{pre}}, \Omega_{\text{post}})$$

$$\Omega_{\text{pre}} = \{\omega_{\text{pre}} = (s, a) \mid s \in S(M), a \in A(M), \text{precond}(s, a)\}$$

$$\Omega_{\text{post}} = \{\omega_{\text{post}} = (a, s) \mid s \in S(M), a \in A(M), \text{postcond}(a, s)\}$$


Overview of HRRT Levels and Iterations




$$\mathcal{H}_4(M, \mathcal{H}_2(M), \mathcal{H}_3(M), \Sigma) = M'$$

HRRT4 uses dialogue prompts in Σ to prompt deeper reflections on general safety, domain-specific questions, and “unknown unknowns”

Overview of HRRT Levels and Iterations



Overview of HRRT Levels and Iterations



HRRT Experiments Overview



Given basic information about the domain M^0 , the red robot agents query the human-robot blue team to **update the team's modeled knowledge**. This process **assumes the blue team** (specifically human agents) have **some perspective or insight** about the domain.

HRRT Experiments Overview



Through simple English-like interactions, the **human-robot team** explores safety in different problem domains.

We iterate through the human-robot red teaming exercise, saving the **model hypothesis for each iteration.**

HRRT Experiments Overview



All new symbols to the model hypotheses are **proposed by the blue computational ChatGPT agent**, as a result of prompts from the **red computational chatbot agent**.

Example Interaction

Consider a team of robots conducting science experiments on the surface of Mars, communicating with ground control on Earth over time delay.

Example Interaction

Consider a team of robots conducting science experiments on the surface of Mars, communicating with ground control on Earth over time delay.

HRRT2: Analysis of Possibilities

Red Computational Agent Prompt

The model indicates that if `mission_interrupted`, then `robot_available` should not be possible.

Human-Robot Blue Team Response

Correct, a mission interruption means the robot should not be available to start new tasks.

Example Interaction

Consider a team of robots conducting science experiments on the surface of Mars, communicating with ground control on Earth over time delay.

HRRT3: Analysis of Assumptions

Red Computational Agent Prompt

The model includes action `activate_redundant_comms`, which should require pre-condition `comm_blackout`.

Human-Robot Blue Team Response

Incorrect, redundancy will be valuable in this domain, even without failures or blackouts.

Example Interaction

Consider a team of robots conducting science experiments on the surface of Mars, communicating with ground control on Earth over time delay.

HRRT4: Analysis of “Unknown Unknowns”

Red Computational Agent Prompt

Are there additional tasks the robot should be taking on?

What catastrophic failures could occur in this domain?

Human-Robot Blue Team Response

Yes, microbial contamination detection and solar panel cleaning.

Major data loss or structural damage due to environment.

Team updates the model based on these reflections.

Example Interaction

Consider a team of robots conducting science experiments on the surface of Mars, communicating with ground control on Earth over time delay.

HRRT4: Analysis of “Unknown Unknowns”

Red Computational Agent Prompt

Are there additional tasks the robot should be taking on?

What catastrophic failures could occur in this domain?


Human-Robot Blue Team Response

Yes, microbial contamination detection and solar panel cleaning.

Major data loss or structural damage due to environment.


Computational agents algorithmically generate or look up information in response to prompts, and the human agents determine relevance.

Ablation Study over HRRT Levels



Each ablation excludes higher levels of analysis. We tested each **model hypothesis** in 200 randomized planning tasks, where each task included a random **set of failure cases**.


Ablation Study over HRRT Levels



Each HRRT level builds upon the knowledge gained from previous levels. This evidence justifies our iterative process through the interrelated HRRT level analyses.

Model Saturation through HRRT Iterations

These experiments also demonstrate saturation of modeled knowledge through HRRT iterations. After iteration 6, the model contained sufficient risk mitigation mechanisms to plan safely according to our set of failures.




Safety-Critical Planning Domains

- Space Applications
 - **Lunar Habitat**: assist astronauts in pressurized lunar habitat
 - **Mars Science Team**: science experiments by team of robots
- Household Applications
 - **Assembly and Repairs**: regular home maintenance
 - **Cleaning**: clean a house where family, children, and pets live
- Everyday Applications
 - **International Travel**: robot personal assistant plans a trip
 - **Vehicle Maintenance**: robot helps diagnose vehicle issues
- Cinematic Applications
 - **Nuclear Warfare**: inspired by *The Iron Giant*
 - **AI Captain**: inspired by *2001: A Space Odyssey*

[49] *The Iron Giant*, Directed by Brad Bird, Warner Bros., 1999.

[50] *2001: A Space Odyssey*, Directed by Stanley Kubrick, Stanley Kubrick Productions, 1968.

Safety-Critical Planning Experiments



Across all tested domains, each iteration made the generated model hypotheses more capable of achieving task goals, mitigating risks, and avoiding critical failures.

Safety-Critical Planning Experiments


Application Class	Problem Domain	Planning Successes	Total Tasks	Success Rate
Space	Lunar Habitat	49	50	0.98
	Mars Science Team	43	50	0.86
Household	Assembly/Repairs	50	50	1.00
	Cleaning	44	50	0.88
Everyday	International Travel	46	50	0.92
	Vehicle Maintenance	47	50	0.94
Cinematic	Nuclear Warfare	32	50	0.64
	AI Captain	39	50	0.78
TOTAL		350	400	0.875

Overall, our HRRT methods help human-robot teams explore complexities of mitigating risks and acting safely.


Safety-Critical Execution Experiments

The robots learn to predict the best **risk mitigating action** based on the data generated by the **human-robot red team**.

We trained statistically significant, **environment-specific** risk assessment models for a lunar habitat and household environment.




Household Risk Mitigation



The Valkyrie humanoid robot performs tool hand-off tasks in a household environment. Valkyrie assesses the risk of a human walking through the workspace and mitigates the risk by slowing motion to lower risk of injury.

Lunar Habitat Risk Mitigation




The **iMETRO armed robot** performs sample stowage tasks as if in a **lunar habitat**. iMETRO **assesses the risk** of not detecting the sample where expected and **mitigates the risk** by asking for assistance to complete the task.

Risk Assessment and Mitigation Results

Environment	Robot	Total Trials	Correct Risk Mitigating Action Success Rate
Lunar Habitat	iMETRO	7	1.00
Household	Valkyrie	5	0.60
Cumulative	-	12	0.83

Robots of different embodiments learned to assess and mitigate risks under different environment-specific definitions of safety through human-robot red teaming.


Human-Robot Teams in Safety-Critical Tasks



A complete model M^* of an unboundedly complex world is **intractable**. A **simplified model M** makes reasoning possible but **may dangerously oversimplify**.


Computational agents have their model M built in, **limiting their understanding** to symbols in that model. But with their large amount of real-world experience, humans can introduce **new symbols** to **expand the team's understanding** to “unknown unknowns.”

Human-Robot Teams in Safety-Critical Tasks



Our human-robot red teaming paradigm leverages this diversity of perspectives: robots use computational approaches to systematically challenge the human agents, and humans use their experience to introduce ideas and make evaluative moral judgments.

Human-Robot Teams in Safety-Critical Tasks




Through this collaborative dialogue, the team iterates on models M, M', M'', \dots to improve their ability to plan around and mitigate risks, while still simplifying reasoning over intractable complete model M^* .

The problem of “unknown unknowns” can never be completely solved. But human-robot red teaming provides more opportunities for the team to reason about safety, promote understanding, calibrate trust, and improve knowledge of the problem domain.


Future Work for Human-Robot Red Teaming

Future work beyond the scope of the dissertation includes:

- Deploying **model hypotheses on robots** executing real-world tasks
- Investigating **composition of human-robot teams** for expert insights
- Testing more advanced language capabilities for **improved safety dialogue**



Safety Reasoning on Human-Robot Teams



The **human-robot red teaming** approach demonstrates the value of **safety reasoning** where teams engage in **multiple levels of critical analysis** in a problem domain (UR 2025, Under Review).


Our methods **reduce overtrust** and allow robots to **earn appropriately calibrated trust** on cooperative human-robot teams.

Dissertation Contributions

Autonomous **planning of complex assembly actions**
(ICRA 2022)

Reliable and **explainable execution of tool-use tasks**
(IROS 2024)

Safety reasoning on human-robot teams
(UR 2025, Under Review)





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
Safety reasoning on human-robot teams
(UR 2025, Under Review)



Human-Robot Teams in Safety-Critical Domains

The dissertation explores challenges in (1) robot manipulation capabilities and (2) robot safety reasoning.

Our work contributes to robots operating as capable, trusted agents on **human-robot teams in safety-critical problem domains.**



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Emily Danes

Dennis Nikolov

Mina Kian

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


Mickey Sheetz



Vicky Sheetz


Family



Family



Princess



Boogie

Thank You!

Questions?